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TORT LIABILITY OF THE MENTALLY ILL AND
MENTALLY DEFICIENT
WILLIAM J. CURRAN*
A great amount of attention has been given in our courts and
legal literature to the criminal responsibility of persons suffering from
mental disease. There has been very little examination of the tort
responsibility of such persons. This paper is presented as an examina-
tion of the existing case law in this field with a critique of that law
based on an analysis of modern psychiatric classifications of mental
illness and mental deficiency.
THE EXISTING LAw
According to the text-book1 and law-review' commentators and
annotators3 it is becoming settled law in the common law jurisdictions4
of the United States that insane persons are fully responsible for
their torts with the possible exception of those actions requiring a
special intent or malice. This development is sustained in an almost
unbroken, though sparse and often badly reported, line of cases since
early in the Nineteenth Century. It is also statutory law in five
states . 5
For many years the clear trend of the cases was resisted by
the commentators who thought the decisions violative of the fault
principle in tort law.6 This group dominated in the early drafts of
the Restatement of Torts. In the sections on intentional torts, the
problem of the mentally ill actor is ignored. In negligence, the key
section concerns the standard of the reasonable man. As adopted in
* Professor of Legal Medicine and Director, Law-Medicine Research Institute,
Boston University; Lecturer on Legal Medicine, Harvard Law School.
1 Prosser, Torts 791 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Ague, "The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions," 60 Dick. L. Rev. 211
(1955); Wilkinson, "Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability," 17 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 38 (1944).
3 Note, 34 Cornell L.Q. 274 (1948); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 833 (1927); 89 A.L.R. 476
(1934); 28 Am. Jur., "Insane and Other Incompetent Persons" §§ 93-101; 44 CJ.S.,
"Insane Persons," §§ 122-126.
4 Louisiana follows the Civil Law rule of no liability. See Yancey v. Maestri, 155
So. 509 (La. App. 1934). The decision contains a full discussion of question and cites
very adequately the foreign law on the subject.
5 Cal. Civil Code § 41 (1954); Mont. Rev. Code tit. 64, § 113 (1947); N.D. Rev.
Code tit. 14, § 1003, tit. 38, § 0308 (1943) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 25, 26 (1951);
S.D. Comp. Laws §§ 30.0804-5 (1939).
6 See particularly Bohlen, "Liability of Infants and Insane Persons," 23 Mich. L.
Rev. 9 (1924); Hornblower, "Insanity and the Law of Negligence," 5 Col. L. Rev. 278
(1905); Ames, "Law and Morals," 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1908).
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1934, section 283 read: "Unless the actor is a child or an insane
person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid
being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances."
At the very end of the comments to this section the reporters added
a caveat: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane per-
sons are required to conform to the standard of behavior which society
demands of sane persons for the protection of the interests of others."
This, of course, was a polite method of saying that the reporters hoped
that the cases would turn toward non-liability. This method was
used by the Institute in other areas. In 1948, however, with very
few additional cases having been decided, the Restatement reporters
admitted defeat. In the 1948 supplement, section 283 was amended
to make it clear that insane persons are responsible for their negligent
conduct. The bulk of the citations in Professor Eldredge's explana-
tion for the change involve intentional torts. He cites only one new
negligence case and that a municipal court decision in New York.'
The reporter concludes by reasoning that if these jurisdictions would
hold the insane for intentional torts, they "would not hesitate to hold
an insane person for causing the same harm unintentionally. ' s
Elsewhere in the Restatement there are only two provisions
dealing with the subject. In section 289, it is held that inferior intel-
ligence (unless the actor is a minor or "possibly unless he is insane")
will not excuse a person from the requirement of exercising the in-
telligence of a reasonable man in the negligence standard. As regards
intentional torts, no direct statements are made, but in the section
on general capacity it is asserted that the actor may be excused if he
does not possess a "particular state of mind" required for the tort.
As examples, the reporter cites the fact that no specific intent is re-
quired for trespass to land while an intent to imprison is required for
false imprisonment. It should be noted, however, that the section ends
with a sentence calling attention to the fact that, at the time, the
Restatement took no position in regard to the negligence responsibility
of the insane.
Since nearly all of the American cases have denied a defense of
insanity, the courts have been very laconic in expressing what they
mean by the term insanity or in describing what specific psychiatric
evidence was presented by the defendant. Many of the opinions in-
volve the court's sustaining of a demurrer to a defense of insanity
raised in the pleadings.9 Others concern defendants who have already
7 Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934).
8 Restatement, Torts § 283 (Supp. 1948).
9 Feld v. Borodofski, 87 Miss. 727, 40 So. 816 (1906); Bollinger v. Rader, 153
N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910); Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 AtI. 902 (1890);
Becker v. Becker, 207 Misc. 17, 138 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1954).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
been adjudged insane by a criminal court' or as a result of commit-
ment to a mental hospital."
Why have the courts been so unanimous in denying the defense
of insanity in tort cases? The reasons were very well expressed in
the earliest cases and have not been improved upon in later opinions.'
The theories would seem to be four in number:
(1) Tort law, unlike criminal law, is predicated on compensating
for harm done, not inflicting punishment. It looks to the act of the
defendant and its resultant harm, not to guilty intent.
(2) As between the insane actor who caused the harm and his
innocent victim, the tort law looks with favor on the victim. It will
require that the insane person compensate the victim from his available
estate rather than allow the loss to fall wholly on the victim.
(3) The imposing of liability on insane persons will encourage
custodians and guardians of the insane to prevent their wards from
inflicting harm on others.
(4) Were a rule of non-responsibility for the insane to be
adopted, it could be used as a fraudulent defense since the absence
of mental illness may be difficult to prove.
Prosser has listed another possible reason for the courts' position
against non-liability: "an unexpressed fear of introducing into the
law of torts the confusion and unsatisfactory tests attending proof of
insanity in criminal cases."'
It should be noted that the reasons as above listed apply to all
types of torts without exception. This circumstance, plus the broad
language of the Restatement, will present some difficulties in applica-
tion as we examine the case law in the separate causes of action.
Intentional Torts
As indicated earlier, it seems well settled that insane persons will
be held liable for the less sophisticated intentional torts such as
10 Phillips' Committee v. Ward, 241 Ky. 25, 43 S.W.2d 331 (1931); Shapiro v.
Tchernowitz, 3 Misc.2d 617, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1956); Guardianship of Meyer, 218
Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935). See also Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396
(1928).
1 The bulk of all of the cases involving mentally ill defendants are in this category.
See, for example Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S.W. 155 (1910); Van Vooren v.
Cook, 273 App. Div. 88, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1947); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150
Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934); Sweeney v. Carter, 24 Tenn. App. 6, 137 S.W.2d
892 (1939) ; Shedrick v. Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311, 172 Atl. 630 (1934).
12 See particularly McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E.2d 239 (1887); Morse
v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (1845).
'3 Prosser, Torts 792 (2d ed. 1955).
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trespass to land,'14 conversion,"m and assault and battery." In false
imprisonment there is only one decision, an 1848 New York case,"
which holds liability.
In assault and battery we find a fairly strong line of cases, the
largest for any one tort. All but one of the cases are very simply
written and in broad lines they merely assert that insane persons are
responsible for their torts. Up to 1959, the leading cases were McGuire
v. Almy'5 and Van Vooren v. Cook.19 Both involved batteries on
persons attending severely mentally ill patients. In McGuire the
plaintiff was a nurse attending a patient confined to a sick room at
home, while in Van Vooren the plaintiff was a ward attendant in a
mental hospital. In 1959, however, a district court of appeals in
California had occasion for the first time to apply its code provision
in regard to mentally ill tortfeasors. Section 41 of the Civil Code
reads, "A minor, or person of unsound mind, of whatever degree, is
civilly liable for a wrong done by him, but is not liable in exemplary
damages unless at the time of the act he was capable of knowing that
it was wrongful." The court, in Mullen v. Bruce,20 had before it an
alcoholic patient who, in delirium tremens, assaulted a nurse who was
trying to prevent the patient from leaving the sanatarium. In con-
sidering the case before him, Justice Griffen referred to the above code
provision and a recent California case2 which held a four-year-old
child for battery. He then cited McGuire v. Almy, supra, the Massa-
chusetts case which is very similar in its facts and which holds lia-
bility. Justice Griffen then concluded,
14 Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258 (Ind. 1843); Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 (1870)
("idiot or insane person"); Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Showalter, 3 Pa. Super. 452 (1897);
Cathcart v. Matthews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 S.E. 1021 (1916); In re Guardianship of
Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935) (the facts are not clear on whether the
defendant's act of setting fire to the plaintiff's property was intentional or negligent;
cGmmentators seem to list the case as involving an intentional burning).
15 Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (1845). See also William v. Careron, 26 Barb.
Ch. 172 (N.Y. 1857).
10 Mullen v. Bruce, 168 Cal. App. 2d 494, 335 P.2d 945 (1959) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Francisco, 149 Ky. 307, 148 S.W. 46 (1912); McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323,
8 N.E.2d 760 (1937); Feld v. Borodofski, 87 Miss. 727, 40 So. 816 (1906); Gibson v.
Pollack, 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S.W. 874 (1914); Van Vooren v. Cook, 273 App. Div. 88,
75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1947); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918). See
also Sauer v. Sack, 34 Ga. App. 748, 131 S.E. 98 (1925) (the defendant claimed to
suffer from "epileptic or other like attacks"; court treated defense as that of insanity
and denied defense).
17 Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647 (N.Y. 1848) (mentally ill justice of the
peace brought plaintiff before him on invalid criminal complaint).
Is 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937).
19 273 App. Div. 88, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1947).
20 168 Cal. App. 2d 494, 335 P.2d 945 (1959).
21 Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
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There seems to be no apparent distinction between such a person
[an insane personi and a four-year-old child insofar as it bears on
the question here involved. . . . An infant is liable for his torts
even though he lacks the mental development and capacity to
recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct so long as he has the
mental capacity to have the state of mind necessary to the com-
mission of the particular tort with which he is charged. 22
In regard to the case before him, the judge asserted, "Whether
the defendant had sufficient capacity to intend the violent conduct
essential to the commission of battery was a factual question for the
trial judge."2 3
In its essential characteristics, the Mullen case is in accord with
the other decisions in this area. It does hold liability. However, it
requires a factual examination of an intent, even so general an intent
as that to commit "violent conduct." It makes the standard for
mentally ill persons the same as that for infants, an interpretation of
the Civil Code which is not required by its language. Through such
an analogy, some mentally ill persons could be held not responsible
for battery--or other torts-as long as they did not "intend" their
conduct, or, did not have the required "capacity." And yet, the Civil
Code says insane persons are responsible for their torts no matter
what the "degree" of unsoundness of their minds.
It is understandable that Justice Griffen should fall into applying
to the insane the same test as is applied to infants. The first evidence
of this inclination is found in a 1924 article by Professor Bohlen en-
titled Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons.2 4 The law
which Bohlen deals with does not treat the two types of defendants
in the same manner. He does, however, argue that the courts should
treat them the same way and should apply a fault principle to them,
thus discharging some of each group from responsibility for their
torts. Later, Prosser in his text opens a discussion of insanity with
the statement: "Lunatics usually are classed with infants, and are
held liable for their torts."2 5 The case authorities cited by Dean Prosser
in this section do not make this classification.
Continuing with the subject of intentional torts, a series of cases28
22 Mullen v. Bruce, 168 Cal. App. 2d 494, 335 P.2d 945, 947-948 (1959).
23 Mullen v. Bruce, supra note 22, at 497, 335 P.2d at 947.
24 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1924).
25 Prosser, Torts 791 (2d ed. 1955).
26 McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E.2d 239 (1887); Roberts v. Hays, 284
Ill. App. 275, 1 N.E.2d 711 (1936); Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348 (1927);
Phillips' Committee v. Ward, 241 Ky. 25, 43 S.W.2d 331 (1931); Young v. Young, 141
Ky. 76, 132 S.W. 155 (1910); Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 At. 902 (1890); Bol-
linger v. Rader, 153 N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910); Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 3 Misc. 2d
617, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1956); Eliot v. Sternberg, 61 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1946); Ross v.
York, 233 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. CA. 1950).
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involving wrongful death actions as a result of intentional killings
provides our next strongest line of authority from the courts. Without
exception, all of these cases hold the insane defendant liable for
compensatory damages. A number of the cases concern defendants
previously discharged from criminal homicide by reason of their
insanity,2 7 or defendants who were confined to mental hospitals after
the killings.2" In Bollinger v. Rader 9 the defendant had been con-
fined to a mental hospital and was discharged as "safe" by the hos-
pital. Shortly after his release he shot and killed the plaintiff's in-
testate. In Young v. Young,3" two police officers were sent to the
home of the defendant to arrest him as insane and, apparently, to
deliver him to a mental hospital. When they tried to seize him, the
defendant shot and killed one of the officers.
In one of the most interesting cases in the field, Parke v. Den-
nard,3 ' the Alabama court held a mentally ill person (a paranoid
personality) for damages under the Alabama wrongful death act
which measures recovery only on a punitive basis. The defendant
had earlier been discharged of criminal liability for the same killing
by reason of insanity. In the trial of the civil case, the defendant
again pleaded his insanity and presented expert testimony that he was
suffering from paranoia. Paranoia is a psychosis, a severe mental
disease warranting confinement to a mental hospital. The defendant
was so committed after the criminal trial. In that hospital he came
under the care of two psychiatrists. These psychiatrists testified for
the plaintiff at the civil trial and gave it as their opinion that the
defendant was "a paranoid personality, but not a paranoiac, and that
while defendant was 'eccentric and cranky' he was not suffering from
a mental disease when he entered the state institution."3 They as-
serted that in their opinion the defendant was not suffering from a
mental disease when he committed the homicide. In answer to ques-
tions based on the M'Naghten Rules, the psychiatrists answered that
"such a [paranoid] personality has sufficient will power to refrain
from doing wrong if he so desired, and that he had sufficient mentality
to know that it was wrong to do the particular act in question. ' 33 On
this evidence, the appellate court refused to upset the verdict of
$20,000 as granted below.
27 Phillips' Committee v. Ward and Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, supra note 26. See
also Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396 (1928).
28 Young v. Young; Jewell v. Colby; Bollinger v. Rader; Ross v. York, all cited
supra note 26.
29 153 N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910).
30 141 Ky. 76, 132 S.W. 155 (1910).
31 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396 (1928).
32 Parke v. Dennard, supra note 31, at 213, 118 So. at 400.
33 Id. at 214, 118 So. at 400.
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The Alabama decision is not out of line with the other decisions
discussed in this section. The court clearly admitted that were the
defendant found insane (or, in this case, suffering from paranoia), it
would be a valid defense to the civil action because such persons are
not liable for punitive damages. However, the plaintiff's evidence
was enough to sustain a finding that the defendant was not suffering
from "a mental disease" and was therefore wholly liable. Today,
these same lines are drawn in psychiatry bewteen paranoia and para-
noid personalities, but psychiatrists might be less apt to refuse to
classify the latter as a mental disease.
Misrepresentation
I have found only three decisions34 under American common law
involving insane persons and the tort of misrepresentation. Only
two of them are authoritatively presented and they are in conflict.
The most recent decision occurred in the Supreme Court of Kings
County, New York City, in 1954. In Becker v. Becker3" the plaintiff
sued her husband for "fraud and deceit" in representing before their
marriage that he was not suffering from any serious ailments when ac-
tually he was then visiting a psychiatrist in treatment for "a mental
illness known as schizophrenia."36 The defendant moved for judgment
on the pleadings. Judge Brenner granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint, finding that on the basis of the complaint the defendant
was incapable of fraud and thus not responsible in tort. For the
proposition that an incompetent (which, it seems, Judge Brenner
considered the same as insanity) is incapable of deception the court
cited two cases, Chaddock v. Chaddock17 and Williams v. Hays.6
The Chaddock case is almost the same as Becker on its facts, but
the wife was seeking and received an annulment of the marriage, an
entirely different issue. The Williams case is a negligence action hold-
ing that insane persons are responsible for their torts. It contains
dicta that such persons may not be responsible for torts in which
malice is required such as defamation and malicious prosecution.
Misrepresentation is not mentioned by the court as an exception to
the general rule of liability.
The other case in this area is Spaulding v. Harvey,39 an 1891
Indiana decision. Here, two mentally ill persons under guardianship
34 Ragan v. Cox, 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2at 681 (1946); Spaulding v. Harvey, 129
Ind. 106, 28 N.E. 322 (1891); Becker v. Becker, 207 Misc. 17, 138 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1954).
35 Becker v. Becker, supra note 34.
36 Id. at 19, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
37 130 Misc. 900, 226 N.Y.S. 152 (1928).
38 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894).
39 129 Ind. 106, 28 N.E. 322 (1891).
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fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to execute a mortgage by telling
them that they had been discharged from the guardianship as being
mentally competent. The court held the mortgage void, since it was
made while the defendants were under guardianship, but asserted:
"One may, however, be so weak intellectually as to be incapable of
managing his estate, and thus be legally subjected to guardianship,
and still be capable of perpetrating a fraud."" ° This pronouncement
about mental capacity was not followed by citations to authority,
either legal or psychiatric.
The only other case which can be cited in this field is Ragan v.
Cox4' wherein the defendant was charged with fraudulently inducing
a 12-year-old girl to marry him. In a rather uncertain manner, it
might be said that the defendant submitted some lay testimony that
he, a fifty-two-year-old man, was of low intelligence. The Arkansas
court interpreted this as an insanity defense and dismissed it, asserting
broadly the usual proposition that insane persons are liable for their
torts.
On the basis of the above decisions we certainly cannot assert
an American common law rule of responsibility of the insane for
misrepresentation. The cases are too few, they are in conflict, and
they do not present any well-developed theory of liability or non-
liability.
Any proper analysis of the responsibility of the mentally ill in
this area would require an examination of the still-developing bases
of liability for the tort as a whole. Misrepresentation first arose as
the intentional tort of deceit.41 It required "scienter," or, an intent to
deceive. Looked at more deeply, scienter means a lack of belief in
the truth of the representation made. At present, however, many
states impose liability for negligent misrepresentation, and some hold
strict liability without fault for certain types of false statements.43
An application of responsibility to mentally ill persons would depend,
therefore, on which basis of liability was applied. Only on a firm ap-
plication of the requirements of intentional deceit would there seem
any opportunity for avoidance of responsibility.
Defamation
The alleged insanity of the defendant has been used in defamation
cases in two ways to the advantage of the defendant. The first is to
apply it in mitigation of damages by showing that since the com-
40 Spaulding v. Harvey, supra, note 39, at 108, 28 N.E. at 324.
41 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.,V.2d 681 (1946).
42 Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term. Rep. 51 (1789); 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability 375 (1906).
43 Prosser, Torts 541-549 (2d ed. 1955).
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munity was aware of the defendant's mental illness and therefore
did not believe him, the defendant's reputation was not injured. This
method has been successful in at least four cases of slander.44
The second area where a defendant may use a defense of insanity
is, of course, in regard to liability itself. There is dicta in some of the
earliest cases, 45 some recent cases,46 and in many of the text books4"
that an insane person is not liable for defamation because of the re-
quirement of "malice" in the tort. Dictum in an 1898 lower court
decision4" in New York dismissed this theory as applicable only in
cases where a qualified privilege is available to the defendant. How-
ever, it can be asserted that two cases, the only reasonably clear
opinions in this field, do hold the existence of insane delusions a
defense to a slander action. The Kentucky court in 1904 discharged
an insane person after quoting from Cooley and others, but in its
specific holding asserted
• ..in order to defeat a recovery in a case like the one at bar
upon the ground of insanity, it should satisfactorily appear from
the evidence that at the time of speaking the defamatory words
the person uttering them was either totally deranged, or laboring
under an insane delusion on the subject to which the words
related.49
Under a similar rule, a Virginia court in 1817 granted an injunction
to prevent a slander action where the defendant was insane "on the
subject to which the defamatory words were related," though it also
said, "... . his mind was sound in other respects."50 The judges who
wrote these two decisions could have known little of "modern psy-
chiatry," but they laid down remarkably sound theories of mental
illness.
Alienation ol Affections
The action of alienation of affections is often said to require
a specific intent or malice. A Tennessee court would seem to have
44 Wilson v. Walt, 138 Kan. 205, 25 P.2d 343 (1933) (local notoriety of insanity
of defamer can mitigate damages to such a degree as to eliminate cause of action);
Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 77 S.W. 1106 (1904); Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225
(1812); Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199 (Tenn. 1845). See also Yeates v. Reed, 4
Blackf. 463 (Ind. 1838) (insanity of defendant can be received in excuse or mitigation
of damages according to circumstances of the case).
45 McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239 (1887); Feld v. Borodofski, 87
Miss. 727, 40 So. 816 (1906); Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894).
46 Eliot v. Sternberg, 61 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1946); In re Guardianship of Myers, 218
Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935).
47 Cooley, Torts 192-193 (Haggard, ed. 1932) ; Prosser, Torts 792-793 (2d ed. 1955).
48 Ulrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. 168, 50 N.Y.S. 788 (1898) (case does not
involve an insanity defense).
49 Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 320, 77 S.W. 1106, 1108 (1904).
50 Homer v. Marshall's Adm'x, 5 Munf. 466, 477 (Va. 1817).
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required a showing that a person of unsound mind be capable of
having malice or improper motives toward the defendant in order
to be held liable for the tort'1 In the only other case in this area, the
Vermont supreme court in 1934 denied a defense of insanity to an
action of alienation of affections with the familiar statement that
insane persons are responsible for their torts.2 The authority for
their finding is an 1845 Vermont decision holding an insane person
for conversion.rJ
Negligence
There are presently only two reported American cases54 involv-
ing the responsibility in negligence of insane persons. Both are from
the same jurisdiction. They hold liability with the blanket rationale
that insane persons are responsible for their torts. No distinction
is drawn between the rule of liability for negligence and that for any
other tort.
We have seen earlier that the Restatement55 has always taken
the position that mentally deficient persons will be held to the objective
standard of reasonableness in negligence law. Since the 1948 amend-
ments it also takes the position that insane persons are responsible
for their torts.5" It was the Sforza case,57 a lower court decision in
New York City, which was cited by Professor Eldredge as the only
new case in point holding liability at the time of the amendment. It
is noteworthy that the Sforza case should have occasioned the change
in the Restatement. In that case it is alleged that a bus driver for
the defendant company "suddenly became insane and apparently
lost control of the bus""8 which struck a parked vehicle and
injured the plaintiff. The driver was immediately committed to a
mental hospital and was still a patient at the time of the trial. The
insanity of the driver was alleged as a defense to the negligence action.
51 Sweeney v. Carter, 24 Tenn. App. 6, 137 S.W.2d 892 (1939).
52 Shedrick v. Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311, 172 At. 630 (1934).
53 Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (1845).
54 Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894), 157 N.Y. 541, 52 N.E. 539
(1899); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934). Williams
v. Hays involves a sea captain whose ship ran aground. The captain had been on the
bridge continuously for some days and was in a state of exhaustion and/or mental
disorder when the ship was in distress. The court dismissed mental illness as a defense
in a negligence action. The reasoning in the case is unclear and uncertain. As Wilkinson
said, "The reported opinions involving this controversy indicate that Williams v. Hays
is filled with the drama of the sea, but is not very enlightening as to the law of the
land." Op. cit. supra, Note 2, at 43.
55 Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934), p. 2 supra.
56 Id. § 283 (Supp. 1948), p. I supra.
57 Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934).
58 Id. at 180, 268 N.Y.S. at 446.
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judge Pette indicates that "defendants suggest that the insanity
may have been produced by a state of mind on the part of [the driver]
induced by his wife's expectant motherhood that morning." 59 It would
seem that at trial evidence was submitted of "unusual and irra-
tional acts of the driver at the time of and immediately following the
accident."6
Judge Pette dismissed the defense of insanity as not available in
an action of negligence. He cited Williams v. Hays6 as authority
for this position in New York law and he refused to recognize any
distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance for the purposes
of this defense. He indicated his agreement with the policy reasons
for holding insane persons for their torts as expressed in McIntyre v.
Sholty.62
The difficulty presented by the Sforza case is not in its result.
It is similar to nearly all of the other cases reviewed in this article
in its treatment of the legal and psychiatric issues involved in the
case, i.e., it gives us only a very sketchy picture of what was actually
wrong with the bus driver, and it dismisses the defense of insanity
just about as summarily as other opinions. However, unlike most of
the other cases, it involves sudden mental illness resulting in a general
loss of control by the defendant. Up to the moment of the accident
the defendant was apparently acting normally and was functioning
quite well in society-driving a bus. Had the driver had any other
kind of illness without warning at the wheel, he would not have been
liable for the injuries caused. It would then have been classed as an
unavoidable accident. For example, had he sustained a heart attack, 3
cerebral hemorrhage,64 an epileptic seizure,65 gone blind,66 or sud-
denly fallen asleep,67 or otherwise fainted or become unconscious, 68
he would have been excused. What are the distinctions between these
cases and sudden mental illness? The policy reasons for holding in-
59 Id. at 181, 268 N.Y.S. at 447.
60 Id. at 181, 268 N.Y.S. at 447.
61 Supra note 54.
62 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E.2d 239 (1887).
63 Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley, 81 Ohio App. 427, 76 N.E.2d 629 (1947).
64 Keller v. Wonn, 140 W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
65 Moore v. Capital Transit Co., 226 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Wishone v. Yellow
Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936).
66 Livandais v. Block, 13 La. App. 345, 127 So. 129 (1930) (dictum).
67 Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 At. 432 (1925); Kaplan v. Kaplan,
213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682 (1931) ; Steele v. Lackey, 107 Vt. 192, 177 At. 309 (1935).
68 Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Ford v. Carew & English, 89
Cal. App. 2d 199, 200 P.2d 828 (1948); Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. 180, 229 N.W.
433 (1930) ; Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P.2d 553 (1934);
Slattery v. Haley, Ont. L.R. 52, 95, 3 D.L.R. 156 (1923).
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sane persons for their torts are not as weighty in a sudden illness case
as in a situation where a confirmed mental patient commits a tort.
It must be admitted, however, that proof problems are more
difficult in sudden mental illness cases than where the defendant
alleges and offers proof of a more continuous mental disturbance.
By deciding the case as it did, the New York court does provide
us with authority for the position that no matter how sudden the
onset of the mental disease, it is no defense to a tort action. It is
unfortunate that neither in its facts nor in its reasoning does the case
give us any help in defining what the law means by insanity in the
law of torts.
Contributory Negligence
We might also examine here the existing cases on the legal
standard for the contributory negligence of mentally ill or mentally
deficient plaintiffs. In their recent text, Harper and James assert;
"Probably a subjective standard will be applied in determining the
contributory negligence of insane plaintiffs."6 9 As authority for this
proposition the authors cite five cases. Four involve "plaintiffs of low
intelligence"7 while the other involves an 88-year-old man whose
"mental powers have been blunted with age."'M Three of the cases72
on mental deficiency require that the plaintiff be virtually "devoid
of intelligence" to the extent he be unable to apprehend danger before
the objective standard is relaxed. The remaining case, which allows
a subjective test generally where the plaintiff is below normal intelli-
gence, is a federal common law decision of 1911. 71 The authors do
not cite any contrary decisions.
I have been able to find two contrary cases imposing the objective
standard for contributory negligence. One involves mental illness
(manic-depressive psychosis) ,7 and the other involves mental de-
ficiency.79 The manic-depressive plaintiff was driving an automobile.
The Washington court held that all drivers must exercise reasonable
G9 2 Harper & James, Torts § 16.8 (1956).
70 Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, 190 Fed. 7 (9th Cir. 1911), affirming Hoyden v.
Seattle Elec. Co., 180 Fed. 487 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1910); Worthington v. Mencer, 96
Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892); Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 3 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d
776 (1942) ; Zajaczkowski v. State, 189 Misc. 299, 71 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1947).
71 Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. & Co., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. 900 (1887).
72 Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray and Worthington v. Mencer, supra note 70, spe-
cifically so state, and Zajaczkowski v. State, supra note 70, a case involving a six-year-
old Mongoloid whose mental age was 23/2, holds so in effect, apparently applying the
subjective standard of infant actors.
73 Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, supra note 70.
74 Criez v. Sunset Motor Co., 123 Wash. 604, 213 Pac. 7 (1923).
75 Deisenreiter v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 97 Wis. 279, 72 N.W. 735 (1897).
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care in operation of vehicles for the safety of all highway users. The
court carefully limits its holding to automobile operators.
The Restatement7 "expresses no opinion" on whether or not an
insane person will be tested objectively or subjectively on contributory
negligence.
A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW
In the preceding sections of this paper the existing case law on
the tort liability of persons with mental disease has been examined.
There are, I believe, some striking features to it which might be
summarized here:
(1) The courts are treating nearly all torts alike in denying a
defense of mental disease.
(2) The reasons for holding liability are policy matters having
little to do with theory of the different torts or an analysis of mental
diseases.
(3) There has been almost no attempt to define what is meant
by "insanity" in tort cases.
(4) There are surprisingly few cases in American law in which
an insanity defense has been raised.
The characteristics indicated above are to a great extent inter-
locked as a rationale in the individual decisions we have examined.
The fact that the reasons for holding liability apply equally to all
torts leads the courts to ignore distinctions in the required elements
of the torts. Since they deny the defense rather summarily, they do
not feel the need to analyze or define "insanity." Yet, it seems to
me that if the number of cases increase, our modern courts under
the pressure of better-presented and better-argued defenses may be
forced to entertain at least an examination of the distinctions drawn
above.
In the criminal law, a consistent theory of responsibility can be
maintained. The theories of responsibility in torts, however, are too
divergent to allow such a practice to be easily maintained. To il-
lustrate this point, it seems to me that on the case law previously
examined the most significant developments have been in defamation
and negligence. In defamation, two important cases77 have allowed
a defense of insanity where the defamatory remarks were the result
of deluded thinking. This same theory could be applied to other torts
such as malicious prosecution and abuse of civil process where the de-
fendants act under paranoid delusions.
In the negligence cases, we see an application of the current
76 Restatement, Torts § 464, caveat (1934).
77 Irvine v. Gibson, supra note 49; Homer v. Marshall's Adm'x, supra note go.
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trend to treat all torts alike in regard to the defense of mental disease.
Professor Eldredge in the Restatement, as indicated earlier, thought
that the courts which had held liability for intentional torts "would
not hesitate""8 to hold liability for negligence. This seems to be on
the theory that negligence is a lesser tort and liability is more easily
established. On the contrary, it seems to me a clear extension of the
theory of responsibility. To hold an insane person, i.e., mentally ill or
mentally deficient, for an intentional tort, a court can examine the
rudiments of his conduct, uncontrolled though it may be. To impose
liability for negligence, however, the court must blindly apply the
objective reasonable man standard. To apply the latter is in effect
strict liability upon the mentally ill and mentally deficient imposed
without examination of the circumstances of the act. If this be the
case, I wonder why the courts bother to use common law cause of
action labels such as "battery," "conversion," or "defamation" where
the defendant is mentally ill or mentally deficient? Only where there
is no liability for the same act if done negligently would there be any
need to examine the essential requirements of intentional torts.
The last two characteristics listed above concerning the existing
case law may not seem related. I wonder, however, if the absence of
definitions of "insanity" for the purpose of tort liability is not influ-
enced by the small number of cases decided and on the selective
nature of those cases. A large proportion of this otherwise small
number of decided cases have concerned defendants already adjudged
insane or defendants who were committed to mental hospitals at the
time of the act or at the time of the trial. The fact of this prior
determination of mental disease made it largely unnecessary, it was
thought, for the tort court to go into the question. Also, on the reverse
side of the coin, these cases are an indication of the great hesitency
of defendants and defense attorneys to raise the defense of insanity
in tort litigation unless the fact of the defendant's mental illness is
thrust upon them, or upon the court, by other circumstances. This
hesitancy by the defense to use the excuse of insanity may be due
not only to the opinion that such a defense is futile, but to the fact
that (a) mental illness often goes undetected in such situations, (b) if
it does exist, it may be difficult to prove, and (c) the use of such a
defense, even if successful, may hold relatively worse social conse-
quences for the defendant than paying a tort verdict.
If the above considerations have any merit, then they are a
manifestation of a continued lack of understanding and even continued
fear of mental illness in our society. A proper examination of the
problems of tort liability for the mentally ill and mentally deficient
78 Restatement, Torts § 283, p. 655 (Supp. 1948).
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may therefore be influenced as much by an analysis of the psychiatric
classifications of mental illness in relation to tortious conduct as by
any further arguments about the theories of liability. In the remainder
of this paper, I would like to offer such an analysis.
Mental Deficiency
We might start our examination with the basic distinction be-
tween mental illness and mental deficiency. Some of the case law7"
has lumped the two under "insanity." By mental deficiency we mean
an abnormally low level of intelligence according to the age of the
individual. It is caused by an arrested or imperfect development in
the brain itself usually congenital in origin, but sometimes the result
of disease or trauma. The degree of mental deficiency can be meas-
ured fairly accurately by intelligence quotient tests and is roughly
graded severe, moderate, or mild." Severely or moderately deficient
persons are apt to be institutionalized or otherwise only remotely in
contact with community life.8" Many of the mildly deficient or persons
of borderline intelligence may, however, be able to function in every-
day life if heavy demands and responsibilities are not placed on them.
Functioning in such a way, their low intelligence is often unrecognized.
Such persons are amenable to basic social controls and moral stand-
ards. They can control their conduct. The law usually deals with
them as normal persons and this seems a quite sensible approach.
It would seem likely that any defense of mental deficiency in
a tort action would be limited to the lower levels of the categories of
deficiency. Even in these situations, however, I would guess that
the judges would be reluctant to draw lines of liability and non-liability
based on rigid I.Q. levels.82 They would fall back on traditional con-
cepts such as "capacity" and "intent" and would ask the expert wit-
nesses to testify in these terms. For mental deficiency, at least, the
result would be a test somewhat similar to that used for minors. An
79 See, e.g., Ragan v. Cox, 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2d 681 (1946); Cross v. Kent,
32 Md. 581 (1870). See also Sauers v. Sack, 34 Ga. App. 748, 131 S.W. 98 (1925),
which treats epilepsy as insanity. Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348 (1927),
probably also involved an epileptic defendant.
80 Intelligence quotients below 50 are graded severe; moderate from 50-70; mild
from 70-85. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 23 (1952); Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, Practical Clinical Psychiatry
153 (8th ed. 1957).
81 See cases cited in note 71, supra.
82 Psychiatrists would seem to agree that the categories of mental deficiency should
not be firmly drawn. For individual patients close to the lines in each category "the
groupings will vary with the immediate condition of the patient, as well as the skill
and training of the examiner." Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, op. cit. supra note
80 at 10.
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argument along these lines has more chance of success and, I believe,
greater psychiatric validity, than the older plea to extend the sub-
jective test for minors to all "insane persons."
Mental Illness
The term mental illness or mental disorder is used in psychiatry
to identify a large number of diseases which affect the mental pro-
cesses and behavior of the individual. The diseases can be classified
according to severity with the most serious being called "psychoses."
Much less severe and disabling are the neuroses and personality
disorders.
Psychoses
The severe mental diseases known as psychoses correspond
roughly to what a layman calls insanity. The bulk of the population
of our mental hospitals suffer from these diseases.
Psychoses may be organic or non-organic. The organic psychoses
are associated with or caused by malfunction in the brain itself.8 3
Short-term organic psychoses may be caused by a toxic reaction from
drugs, poisons, or alcohol. Permanent brain damage causing organic
psychoses may be due to congenital factors, disease, or trauma. Per-
sons with organic psychoses suffer, in varying degrees, 'from impair-
ment of all intellectual functions, memory, orientation, judgment, and
emotional control. They may have delusions (gross false beliefs) or
hallucinations (gross false sensory perceptions) .84
Is a breakdown into organic and non-organic psychoses (or
insanity) of significance to tort law? It will be recalled that the law has
traditionally drawn distinctions between physical and mental condi-
tions. We have seen that sudden physical impairment is a defense
to an action in tort. A physical impairment can be very close to a
"mental condition," as in the case of epilepsy, and yet is still a
defense. It seems doubtful that the law will make a distinction be-
tween organic and non-organic psychoses as long as psychiatry itself
lists the two as mental diseases. Epilepsy, for example, is not included
in this group but is classed as a neurological disease, thus indicating
that medicine and law are in agreement in this classification.
83 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 80 at 101 et seq.; White, The
Abnormal Personality 452 et seq. (2d ed. 1956).
84 Noyes, Modern Clinical Psychiatry 110 (4th ed. 1953). In this connection, see
Buckley & T.T.C. v. Smith Transport, 4 D.L.R. 721 (1946), where a truck driver
suddenly believed that his truck was being operated under remote electrical control
from company headquarters. The Ontario court, in deciding that the driver's employer
was not liable to the plaintiff, held that such a delusion would constitute a defense if
it prevented the driver either from appreciating his duty of care or from discharging it.
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If any breakthrough does occur in this area, I would expect it
to be in the acute organic psychotic reactions caused by toxic factors
such as drugs, poisons, and gases. Here, if the exposure to the toxic
factor is due to no fault of the person and where he commits a tort
during a short-duration psychotic episode, I would expect the courts
might classify the reaction as physical, particularly if the defense
attorneys and expert witnesses stress the actual brain impairment.
Such cases could be compared with the dictum one often sees about
"involuntary" alcoholic intoxication being a defense to legal action.
Non-fault exposure to toxic factors such as opiate and sedative drugs,
metallic poisons, and gases are more in the realm of possibility than
the much discussed but seldom observed involuntary alcholic state.
Interesting as the organic psychoses may be, the non-organic,
or so-called functional psychoses, are much more common.85 In this
area are those mental diseases without observable brain malfunction
where the person has varying degrees of personality disintegration and
failure to relate himself to external reality and other people. The two
largest categories of functional psychoses are the manic-depressive
psychoses and the schizophrenic psychoses.
Manic-depressives are disordered primarily in their mood, or
affective beh4vior. They may swing between great overactivity (manic
reaction) and inhibition or retardation (depressive reaction) in their
speech, ideas, actions, or emotions; or they may stay fixed in one
or the other mood. In some patients, delusions or hallucinations may
also occur.
The incidence of these so-called affective or mood disorders
in our population is not accurately known. 6 Mild cases often go
undetected or are treated by general medical practitioners. The ma-
jority of all cases from mild to severe, who seek psychiatric aid,
particularly with the advent of drug therapy, are treated on an out-
patient basis.
Depressed patients in this category are more of a danger to
themselves than to others. They often have suicidal tendencies. In
women patients (and women constitute the majority of patients in the
affective disorders), caution must be taken to protect small children
from harm at the hands of the mother.
Manic patients present more problems for the law than the de-
pressed. The manic is in closer contact with reality. He is less aware
of his illness. His disorder of overactivity is more apt to get him
into trouble than the underactivity of the depressed. In acute mania,
85 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 80, at 72 et seq; White, op. cit.
note 83, at 513 et seq.
86 Id. at 178-179.
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the patient is often combative and destructive. As is said in a leading
psychiatry textbook, "they often indulge in alcoholic and sexual
abuses, unwise investments, and large purchases of useless objects or
of junk. '17 Legal difficulties can obviously arise out of such pro-
pensities.
Measured by existing law, the manic psychotic person would be
responsible for his torts. His intelligence is not impaired; in fact, in
a manic episode he may seem to perform brilliant intellectual feats-
and with surprising speed and enthusiasm. He is in contact with
reality and unless he has accompanying hallucinations or delusions,
any "capacity test" imposed by law would find him capable
of committing all varieties of torts. The only standard of law which
might excuse the manic would be a "control test" or an "irresistible
impulse test." For example, a manic is prone to drive an automobile
at reckless speed without any real ability to control himself in this
respect. In the area of commercial dealings, the eager, fast-talking
manic is apt to be seen both as the perpetrator of a fraud and as its
victim. His odd commercial activities are certainly the "product" of
his mental illness if we would borrow another legal standard used in
criminal laws8 and in will cases.8 9
The largest number of functional psychotics are the schizo-
phrenics, however. This is the commonest form of psychosis in
America today with some 30,000 new cases every year. 0 Unless
treated early, many of its victims become chronic institutional cases.
Schizophrenia (formerly called dementia praecox) comprises a
group of symptoms including inappropriate emotional responses, de-
fective thought processes, delusions, and hallucinations. The disease
is subgrouped in a rather diverse way to identify the particular pa-
tient's symptom complex. The major classifications are the hebe-
phrenic type, paranoid type, catatonic type, and simple type. The
hebephrenic schizophrenics exhibit shallow, inappropriate emotional
responses such as giggling or silly mannerisms. They often have rather
wild delusions and hallucinations. 91 These are the patients who hear
voices, see things, or imagine they are Christ, Hitler, or the first man
on the moon. The paranoid schizophrenics are somewhat like the
hebephrenics in that they also suffer from delusions and hallucina-
87 Id. at 187.
88 See the use of a "product test" in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
89 See, for example, Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120 (1866) (Doe, J., dissent-
ing opinion); In re Strittmater's Estate, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947); see also
Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency," 6 Mo. L. Rev. 141 (1941).
90 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 80 at 195.
91 Noyes, op. cit. supra note 84 at 381.
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tions, but the delusions or hallucinations are more organized and
form a pattern of persecution, or, less frequently, grandeur."
The catatonic schizophrenic has exaggerated periods of over-
activity or stupor. The onset of the disease can be rather sudden
with overactivity, combativeness, and destructiveness similar to the
manic reaction type discussed earlier. These patients generally lapse
into stupor, however9 3 Some have delusions and hallucinations.
The last schizophernic type, the simple, is the smallest of the
categories in total patients, but has one of the poorest prognoses.
These patients may maintain farily good contact with reality and
have few delusions and hallucinations. They rather slowly withdraw
from active life and show little ambition or emotion. 4
There is another and much rarer form of psychosis known as
"paranoia." 95 It is very close to paranoid schizophrenia but with
less general deterioration of the personality. There are no hallucina-
tions. There is a very well organized system of delusions of persecu-
tion or grandeur.
To the layman, the schizophrenics are the people who are most
clearly insane or "crazy." In court, these people, particularly those
who have deteriorated most in general personality and are most out
of contact with reality, are apt to be excused from responsibility in
criminal law, contracts, or wills.
On the tort side, schizophrenics have generally been held for
their actions as have other mentally ill persons. Here, however we
are faced for the first time with a large group of persons who act
in response to delusions and hallucinations. Paranoid types suffering
from persecutory delusions may attack their supposed enemies with
bodily force, false accusations, or false legal claims. As is said in
Ewalt, Strecker, and Ebaugh, "These patients, above all others, are
apt to convince a court or an attorney that they have a legitimate
case. Every psychiatrist of experience has had some contact with
these patients in some form of litigation."9 With this statement I
am in full agreement. I am surprised, however, at the small number
of appellate court cases which have dealt with the subject. We have
seen, nevertheless, that two quite old decisions, one in 181797 and
92 White, op. cit. supra note 83 at 546; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual op. cit.
supra note 80, at 26-27.
93 Noyes, op. cit. supra note 84 at 383; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, op. cit.
supra note 80 at 26.
94 White, op. cit. supra note 83 at 545.
95 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, op. cit. supra note 80 at 28. For a case in-
volving paranoia, see Parke v. Dennard, supra, note 31.
96 Op. cit. supra note 80 at 214.
97 Homer v. Marshall's Adm'x, supra note 50.
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the other in 1904,98 allowed the existence of a delusion in the de-
fendant to provide a defense to a defamation action. The 1904
Kentucky case specifically referred to "an insane delusion on the
subject to which the words related."99  The 1817 Virginia court
spoke of the defendant's insanity in regard to the subject to which
the defamatory words related and mentioned that the defendant's
mind was "sound in other respects."'00 The latter is a very creditable
definition of paranoia.
It would seem, as indicated earlier, that if modern courts accept
the above standard for non-liability for defamation caused by psy-
chotic delusions, the same rule would apply to related torts such as
malicious prosecution, false arrest, and unjustified civil litigation.
Could the judges not also, on the same theory, apply this rule to
violent attacks such as assault and battery similarly related to a
defendant's insane delusions or hallucinations? Any distinction be-
tween these torts based on special intent or a requirement of malice
has largely disappeared from the law at present.
Neuroses and Personality Disorders
It would be rather futile to advance definitions of the large
number of milder mental disorders grouped presently under the neu-
roses (or psychoneuroses) and personality disorders. The neuroses
are less significant for liability questions in tort law than the person-
ality disorders. However, some neurotic reactions can be involved
in tort actions. A person who "freezes" at the wheel of an automobile,
who suffers some other sudden "physical ailment" or "pain" without
physical explanation, may be suffering from a type of neurotic re-
action.'
1s Irvine v. Gibson, supra note 49.
99 Ibid.
100 Homer v. Marshall's Adm'x, supra note 50.
101 Ewalt, Strecker, Ebaugh, op. cit. supra, note 80 at 257, et seq. See also the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, op. cit. supra, note 80 at 31-34. It is stated in the
Manual that the "chief characteristic of [psychoneurotic] disorders is 'anxiety' which
may be directly felt and expressed or which may be unconsciously and automatically
controlled by the utilization of various psychological defense mechanisms (depression,
conversion, displacement, etc.). In contrast to those with psychoses, patients with
psychoneurotic disorders do not exhibit gross distortion or falsification of external
reality (delusions, hallucinations, illusions) and they do not present gross disorganization
of the personality. Longitudinal (lifelong) studies of individuals with such disorders
usually present evidence of periodic or constant maladjustment of varying degree from
early life. Special stress may bring about acute symptomatic expression of such dis-
orders.
'Anxiety' in psychoneurotic disorders is a danger signal felt and perceived by the
conscious portion of the personality. It is produced by a threat from within the
personality (e.g., by supercharged repressed emotions, including such aggressive im-
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The personality disorders, however, seem to me to bristle with
implications for liability in tort. These "disorders" are evidenced
in behavior and show very little indication of subjective anxiety in
the patient (characteristic of neurosis) or withdrawal from reality
(characteristic of psychosis). Persons with personality disorders are
apt to exhibit some symptoms characteristic of more serious mental
disease. Some show paranoid tendencies, aggressive personalities,
compulsive behavior, alternating moods of elation and sadness, or
schizoid personalities.
A special class of personality disorders is presently identified
with antisocial, mainly criminal, conduct. Formerly called "psycho-
pathic personality disorders," they are now classified as "sociopathic
personality disturbances."' 0  In this group are those people who,
pulses as hostility and resentment), with or without stimulation from such external
situations as loss of love, loss of prestige, or threat of injury. The various ways in
which the patient attempts to handle this anxiety results in the various types of
reactions listed below."
These reaction categories are: "anxiety reaction"; "dissociative reaction" (aimless
running or freezing) ; "conversion reaction" (anxiety converted into functional symptoms
in organs or parts of the body) ; "phobic reaction" (neurotic fears of height, animals,
etc.); "obsessive compulsive reaction" (unwanted, repetitive thoughts or actions);
and "depressive reaction."
1102 This classification is found in the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, op. cit. supra note 80 at 38-39. We quote the
definition in full:
Sociopathic Personality Disturbance
Individuals to be placed in this category are ill primarily in terms of society and
of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu, and not only in terms of personal
discomfort and relations with other individuals. However, sociopathic reactions are
very often symptomatic of severe underlying personality disorder, neurosis, or psychosis,
or occur as a result of organic brain injury or disease. Before a definitive diagnosis in
this group is employed, strict attention must be paid to the possibility of the presence
of a more primary personality disturbance; such underlying disturbance will be
diagnosed when recognized. Reactions will be differentiated as defined below.
Antisocial reaction
This term refers to chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble,
profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no real loyalities
to any person, group, or code. They are frequently callous and hedonistic, showing
marked emotional immaturity, with lack of a sense of responsibility, lack of judgment,
and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it appears warranted, reasonable,
and justified.
The term includes cases previously classified as "constitutional psychopathic state"
and "psychopathic personality." As defined here the term is more limited, as well as
more specific in its application.
Dyssocial reaction
This term applies to individuals who manifest disregard for the usual social codes,
and often come in conflict with them, as the result of having lived all their lives in an
abnormal moral environment. They may be capable of strong loyalties. These indi-
viduals typically do not show significant personality deviations other than those im-
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according to the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, ". . . are always in trouble, profiting neither from experi-
ence nor punishment."' 3
Much the same problems with the law may occur with these
so-called personality disorders as outlined earlier in regard to the
more severe mental illnesses except that the proof problems will be
greater. For example, how should the law deal with "the paranoid
personality" as distinguished from the more severely ill paranoid
schizophrenic? Should one type of person have a defense to a tort
action and not the other? I would guess that most of the people
who commit slander or libel in this world are at least "paranoid per-
sonalities" if not worse. Frankly, I think many successful people
are "disturbed" in their personalities according to these definitions
and are "successful" precisely because of their disordered personali-
ties. Certainly there are paranoid tendencies in the newspaper col-
umnists and legislators who are forever seeing "conspiracies" of evil
import all about them. For example (I won't cite any actual legis-
lators, alive or recently dead), Senator Fred Van Ackerman in Allan
Drury's book, Advice and Consent, is certainly at least a paranoid
personality. The Senator is able to do quite a bit of damage to reputa-
tions and to his country from his privileged position. In a tort action
against the Senator, would we allow evidence of his disordered per-
sonality, not severely deluded or hallucinated, to provide a defense
to such action?
Lastly, I would like to cite recent studies in this country0 4 and
Canada"0 5 indicating that maladjusted personalities do tend to become
"accident repeaters." These studies seem to say, in automobile driv-
ing for example, that people "drive as they live," i.e., if they are in
trouble with the criminal courts; are known to social agencies, public
health, and V.D clinics as constantly needing help; and are known
plied by adherence to the values or code of their own predatory, criminal, or other
social group. The term includes such diagnoses as "pseudosocial personality" and
"psychopathic personality with asocial and amoral trends."
Sexual deviation
This diagnosis is reserved for deviant sexuality which is not symptomatic of more
extensive syndromes, such as schizophrenic and obsessional reactions. The term includes
most of the cases formerly classed as "psychopathic personality with pathologic sexu-
ality." The diagnosis will specify the type of the pathologic behavior, such as homo-
sexuality, transvestism, pedophilia, fetishism and sexual sadism (including rape, sexual
assault, mutilation).
103 Ibid.
104 McFarland & Moseley, Human Factors in Highway Transport Safety (1954).
105 Tillmann & Hobbs, "Accident-Prone Automobile Driver; Study of Psychiatric
and Social Background," 106 Am. J. Psy. 321 (1949).
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to the credit agencies, they get into more "accidents" than the general
population.
When I catalogue these findings on personality disorders, I find
myself pulled in various directions. They blur the neater distinctions
in the severe mental disorders. They make much more difficult the
use of general standards for tort liability such as "capacity" and
"intent," and even "delusion" or "hallucination"; and certainly any
test of "product of mental disease or defect" is made very difficult
to accept when such terms can be applied so universally to the con-
duct of large parts of our population. The basic assumptions of our
legal system about free actions and individual fault are challenged
by these psychiatric concepts.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the tort liability of mentally ill and mentally de-
ficient persons depends on considerations of tort theory, social policy,
and the realities of mental disease in our society. At present the
social policy of holding liability dominates in the common law courts
of this country. The tort theory of responsibility in this area is not
as yet resolved, however, while the realities of mental disease are not
clearly presented or understood. Until such time as these factors
have been measured and evaluated in the decisions, the future course
of liability must be considered uncertain.
